Agents that interact in a distributed environment might increase their utility by behaving optimally given the strategies of the other agents. To do so, agents need to learn about those with whom they share the same world. This paper examines interactions among agents from a game theoretic perspective. In this context, learning has been assumed as a means to reach equilibrium. We analyze the complexity of this learning process. We start with a restricted two{agent model, in which agents are represented by nite automata, and one of the agents plays a xed strategy. We show that even with this restrictions, the learning process may be exponential in time. We then suggest a criterion of simplicity, that induces a class of automata that are learnable in polynomial time.
Introduction
Standard notions of equilibria in game theory involve a set of players holding strategies, such that no player can gain by deviating from his current strategy while the others' strategies stay xed. This idea implicitly assumes some degree of knowledge about the players' strategies ?]. An obvious question is how this knowledge came to be. One possible answer is to have the players negotiate over their strategies. This solution cannot hold in the absence of communication.
We are interested in the case in which the players don't communicate with each other, apart from observing each other's move. Thus the problem we pose in this work is the problem of learning: how the players model their opponent and compute their best response at the same 0 This paper has been accepted to the workshop on Adaptation and Learning in Multiagent Systems, to be held at The 1995 International Joint Conference on AI (IJCAI-95), Montreal, August 1995 time? We are also interested in the complexity issue of the learning process.
When a player is engaged in a repeated interaction, he is in fact doing three things at the same time: rst, he is playing the game de ned by the payo structure of the interaction, according to some strategy. If we attribute the players some degree of rationality, this strategy should be what the player believes is a best response to his opponent's strategy. Secondly, he is trying to learn what his opponent's strategy is. Note that the player's incentive to learn is limited to information that is relevant for his own choice of strategy. The third behavior the player might be involved in is what can be called \training". If the player assumes his opponent is also trying to learn his strategy, he might try to in uence the opponent's beliefs, so as to push him towards a preferable strategy. For instance, in the repeated Battle Much is yet to be done before a model allowing for these three simultaneous behaviors is available. We examine a restricted setting: player A chooses a strategy and plays by it. Player B tries to learn A's strategy and design her strategy as a best response to it. We require that B learn A's strategy in polynomial time. We assume A restricts herself to strategies realizable by Deterministic Finite State Automata (DFS). We do so for two reasons: on one hand, DFS strategies have been accepted widely as a model of bounded rationality. On the other hand, learning the structure of an automaton has been shown to be a very hard problem Kearns and ???, 1994] .
We focused, as an example, on the repeated game of The Prisoner's Dilemma (Fig. 2) . However, most, if not all, of our results can easily be generalized to a wider class of two-person non-zero-sum games.
A B D C D P P T S C S T R R Figure 2 : The Prisoner's dilemma game
Related Work
Finite automata players were suggested as a model of bounded rationality, and as a means of resolving the prisoner's dilemma paradox, by Rubinstein Rubinstein, 1985] and by Neyman Neyman, 1985 ]. An extensive survey of the relevant literature appears in Kalai, 1990] . The basic concept underlying this trend is that the players are rational, but are constrained to submit automata of limited size as their agents in the game. The number of states in the automata is accepted as a measure of their complexity. A series of \folk theorems" have shown that if the players are restricted to automata of size sub-exponential in the game length (i.e. the number of rounds) then cooperative behavior can be achieved at equilibrium. This line of work is, in a sense, contrapositional to other common measures of complexity. Papadimitriou Papadimitriou,1992] has shown that as the bound on the number of states of the automaton becomes more restrictive, the problem of designing the optimal automaton becomes harder. Fortnow and Whang Fortnow and Whang, 1994] were the rst to assume total ignorance of the opponent's automaton. They show that in zerosum games, a rational player can discover an optimal strategy w.r.t. the opponent's automaton in polynomial time, but in non-zero-sum games this is not the general case.
The apparent dissent is perhaps made clear by the following observation: Let K A be the limit on the number of states in player A's automaton. If player B is allowed to use an automaton of size super-exponential in K A , she can construct an automaton that will be optimal against any strategy of A. All B has to do, is to construct a 2 KA deep tree, that will enable her to identify A's automaton, then compute the best-reply automaton to every K A size automaton, and attach it to the relevant branch of the tree. This idea has two pitfalls from the point of view of traditional complexity theory. First, it is obvious that the time needed to construct such an automaton is unacceptable. Second, allowing automata of such size undermines the essence of computational learning theory: this automaton is an \instant learning machine". In fact, it serves as a table of all possible states of the world, replacing the desired decision process.
Outline of this paper
Section 2 unfolds the theoretical framework used in this paper. A central concept introduced in this section is that of automata supporting certain payo s. The idea is to restrict the automata to those displaying some level of rational behavior, ensuring they cannot be exploited.
Section 3 addresses the issue of designing an automaton tuned towards a speci c equilibrium payo . The novelty of the work presented is not in the existence of the equilibrium, but in the constructive proof, presenting a polynomial time algorithm. The reason we bring this proof, is that we do not see any point in polynomial time learning of strategies that cannot be designed in polynomial time.
Section 4 is the focal point of this paper. In this section we show that even restricting the set of automata to those supporting rational payo s is not su cient to make them learnable. A further criterion of simplicity is needed. This criterion goes beyond the standard number-of-states criterion.
Preliminaries
This paper examines the role of learning in two-person, non-zero-sum repeated games. In this section we de ne the concepts of games and game equilibrium.
Def. 1 Games ]
A Game is a 3-tuple G = fN; ; g Where: N is the number of players, = f i g i=1:::N , i = f i 1 : : : i Mi g is the set of actions available to player i, and : i i ! R N is the Payo function, i.e. assigns each player a real number payo for any combination of all players actions.
We will use i to denote the payo to player i.
Def. 2 Equilibrium ]
A (Nash) equilibrium in an n-player game is a set of strategies, = f 1 ; :: n g, such that, given that for all i player i plays i , no player j can get a higher payo by playing a strategy other then j .
Consider two players, A, and B, playing this game. Each player's strategy, i , i 2 fA; Bg, is a sequence of actions taken by player i. Strategy i can be represented by a deterministic nite (DFS) automaton where i's actions are given in every state of the automaton and the transitions are determined by the actions taken by i's opponent. For example if the automaton in Fig. 3 represents A's strategy then, both players will stay in the initial state if both perform cooperate. A will move to the other state if he performs cooperate and B performs defect (TIT-FOR-TAT). When one or more players are restricted to playing strategies realized by DFSs, the set of equilibria change.
We will always interpret the notion of equilibrium with respect to the set of strategies available to each player. For instance, in the repeated PD game, if all players are rational, the only equilibrium is mutual defection throughout the game. However Neyman Neyman, 1985 ], Rubinstein Rubinstein, 1985] and others have shown that even if only one player is restricted to an Automaton with a limited number of states, any payo pair in the Individually Rational Region (Fig. 4) We will denote the automaton that represents i's strategy (i 2 fA; Bg), and have Q states by A Q i . In this work, we are concerned with connected automata. 1 When playing against an automaton, the game history is eventually cyclic. If player A is an automaton, and B is indeed trying to maximize her payo , it is enough for her to consider only simple cycles in A (i.e. cycles in which every state is passed only once). Thus, when considering the possible payo s induced by an automaton, it is su cient to examine it's simple cycles. In this we follow other researchers Gilboa and Samet, 1989; Fortnow and Whang, 1994] who used this restriction to avoid \in nitly vengeful" strategies. Connected automata are such that have no disjoint states, i.e. for any states i; j there is an input sequence that leads from i to j. Another way to avoid unrevertable actions is to allow players to opt out (see Mor and Rosenschein, 1994; Mor, 1995] Proof. For any given < ; >, we have the equalities: (5) We have normalized the coe cients values to 1, but the sum of the coe cients should be the number of states of the automaton A Q i , that is Q. Hence, the nal values of the coe cients are given by :
We can now construct the desired automaton. The construction consists of three stages:
Construct a cycle C imp with Q 2 states thatimplements < ; >, using the coe cients computed above to determine the number of states of each type.
3 To be precise, this is the payo the player gets in this state when playing his optimal strategy at that point. We will refer to the payo that B gets as the type of this state. The payo is de ned by the actions of both players, while the state de nes only the action of the automaton player. However, the optimal or best response strategy is unique for any state, even if the state under question would not have been reached by an optimal strategy. Construct a \punishment" chain C pun : Q 2 states in which A plays D. The chain is linked so that B can only escape from it by playing C for Q 2 successive rounds. link C imp to C pun so that any deviation from the cycle will lead to the rst state in C pun , and the last punishing state is linked back to the rst state of the cycle. This automaton -supports < ; > because this is the way we built it.
Notice that after we have computed the coe cients from equations 4 to 6 (in O(1) time), we can build the automaton by determining the action and the transitions among the states in one pass over all states. Proof.
For any < ; >, we construct an automaton that -supports < ; > as follows:
Build a cycle, C imp that implements < ; > as in Theorem 1. Denote it the consensus cycle. Build the punishing chain, C pun that is based on the automaton presented in Fortnow and Whang, 1994] . The idea is to choose a random binary string of Cs and Ds and to construct the punishing chain so that B can escape from it only by following this string. It was shown in Fortnow and Whang, 1994 ] that C pun cannot be learnt in polynomial time. Therefore if B enters C pun then TL B (A Q A ) = (2 Q ).
Lemma 2.1 B enters C pun with probability (1 ? (
Q 2 ).
Proof. When B visits a state in the consensus cycle for the rst time, he has no information regarding which action he should choose in order to stay in this cycle. Hence with probability 1 2 , B stays in the consensus cycle and with probability 1 2 , he enters C pun . There are Q 2 states in the consensus cycle, therefore the probability of B following the whole consensus cycle is given by ( 1 2 ) Q 2 and the probability of B entering C pun is (1 ? (
Q 2 ). Exponential time might not disturb some researchers. Many of the strategies discussed in the context of PD are two or three state automata strategies. However, note that the number of states de nes the granularity of the grid of possible payo vectors. Thus, for instance, the class of twostate automata allows for 10 distinct payo vectors, only 3 or 5 of which are in the rational region (depending or the relation between S, P, and R). 
Learnable Automata Strategies
Our objective is to categorize a class of game-playing automata that are learnable in polynomial time. The categorization we propose is based on a criterion of simplicity. Indeed, one motivation for studying automatabased strategies was their relative simplicity. Although the standard measure of complexity used for automata is the number of states, it obviously does not capture the intuitive notion of complexity. Consider the automaton we used as an example for unlearnability. Clearly, it is more complex than an automaton with the same number of states, which are all identical.
Def. 7 C simp ] In the course of theorem 1 we de ned four types of states (see Footnote 3) in an automaton for the PD game. We will group the states of the automaton into chunks of connected (in the automaton graph) states of the same type. Let #(A) be the number of states in an automaton A, and #C(A) be the number of chunks of equi-type states. We denote by < c the complexity relation between two automata:
The class of simple automata is: C simp A : 9 < ; > s:t: A supports < ; >8Ã :Ã supports < ; >) A < cÃ Proof. The proof consists of the following stages:
First, we show a canonical structure of the automata in C simp , then we compute the size of this class using the canonical structure. This size is polynomial in the number of states of the automata, therefore a polynomial number of examples is su cient to distinguish among the di erent automata in the class.
Lemma 3.1 Any automaton in C simp consists of a consensus cycle and a punishment chain.
Proof. By de nition, an automaton A in C simp is a minimal-complexity automaton that supports a certain < ; >. Since it supports < ; > it must have at least one cycle that implements this payo vector. Among all these cycles, choose the one that is minimal in complexity and call it the consensus cycle (i.e. C imp ). The transition table of the automaton holds two entries for each state in the consensus cycle. One entry is part of this cycle and the other is not, leading to another chain which eventually will have a connection back to the consensus cycle. We are left to prove that there is at most one such chain.
Assume the contrary. Choose the chain,C, s.t. B (C) is minimal. Denote by sC a state inC that is accessed from the consensus cycle. Redirect all the transitions out of the consensus cycle to sC. Since all the other chains di erent fromC and the consensus cycle are no longer accessible, remove them. We have constructed an automaton that still supports < ; > but has less states than A in contradiction to A being in C simp . DenoteC the punishment chain.
Lemma 3.2 All the states in the punishment chain are of type S.
Proof. From Lemma 3.1, we know that there exists at most one punishment chain in automaton A. Replace this chain, C pun , by another one, C 0 pun , with the same number of states which are all of type S. Denote by A' the modi ed automaton.
B (C 0 pun ) B (C pun ) so if A supported < ; > so does A'. However, A 0 c A (A 0 = c A when the states in C pun are equi-type). therefore A 2 C simp i all the states in C pun were equi-type.
By contradiction, assume all the states in C pun are of type di erent from S. W.lo.g. assume this type is P.
Every chainC 6 = C imp in A can be decomposed into two parts: a pre x of C imp that will be denoted by h, and C pun . The average payo of B inC is given by B (C) = K h h + K pun P K h + K pun where K h is the number of states in h, K pun is the number of states in C pun and h is the average payo that B receives in h.
Let K 0 pun be the number of states in C pun when they are all of type S and B (C) remains unchanged.
K h ( h ? P) + ; > 0 Therefore K 0 pun < K pun in contradiction to the assumption that A is in C simp .
Lemma 3.3 For each automaton A 2 C simp , and for each type of state t, there is at most one chunk of states of type t in A.
Proof. By contradiction: assume that 9A 2 C simp 9t s.t. there is more than one chunk of states of type t in A. We construct an automatonÃ that supports the same payo vector, andÃ < c A. This contradicts A being in C simp : all we have to do is to group all the states of type t together.
Lemma 3.4 jC simp j < 4!Q 3 Proof. There are four possible types of states, therefore by Lemma 3.3 there could be at most four chunks. Hence there are 4! possible ways to arrange them. Each chunk has at most Q states, but the number of states in one of the chunks is determined by the size of the others. Therefore there are less than Q 3 possible combinations of chunks' sizes for each of the 4! arrangements.
We have shown that for every Q, the number of automata with O(Q) states in C simp is polynomial in Q. Therefore, player B could enumerate all the possible automata and he could learn which automaton is A's in time polynomial in A's automaton's size. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
An example of a learning algorithm
So far, we dealt with all payo vectors in the individually rational region. However, the range of possible payo s requires a more detailed inspection in our context.
In the setting we studied, player A designs an automaton that is \tuned" towards a certain payo vector, and player B tries to learn that automaton and play accordingly. It is reasonable that A will choose an automaton that gives B a payo of P (or P + ), so as to maximize his own payo . However, we might want to allow more complex situations, emerging from various possible beliefs of the players. Consider, for instance a setting in which B can opt out of the game, and be matched with a di erent partner. If both players believe B can receive an expected payo of if he opts out, then A will construct his automaton so as to award B at least in equilibrium 5 . Let us assume that A restricts himself to strategies that grant B a payo of at least at equilibrium. Still, among all these strategies, A will choose that which maximizes his own payo . Consider again the graph in Figure 4 . Given that A maximizes his payo for a certain minimal payo he attributes to B, the only possible payo s to be received by both players can be represented in the upper and rightmost boundaries. The rst line is de ned by K R + K T = 1 and the second is de ned by K R + K S = 1.
Assuming player B knows that A's automaton is simple, i.e., A's automaton is in C simp , we construct the following learning algorithm for B (see Figure 6 ). forever. Hence we have added in B's learning algorithm, a step where B will play D to prevent A from abusing him. B will discover the size of Q in polynomial time since he will know it after log 2 steps.
Conclusions and Future Work
When players do not communicate about their actions, it might take each of them exponential time to nd the best response to his opponent's strategy. We have shown that this holds even if one of the players is playing a xed, Nash{equilibrium strategy.
We have rst de ned the notion of an automaton that supports a payo vector < ; >. We have also presented an algorithm to design an automaton that supports a certain payo vector to be received by the players if they play according to it. We have shown that the complexity of this algorithm is polynomial in the number of states of the automaton. The reason for deriving this proof is that we do not see any point in polynomial time learning of strategies that cannot be designed in polynomial time.
We have de ned the class of automata C simp that can be learned in polynomial time and we have also given an example sub-class for which we have speci ed the learning algorithm.
Other issues that need to be further investigated regard extensions of the results presented in this paper: In the Prisoner's dilemma, a player can punish his opponent without harming himself. An interesting question is which payo s can be supported when this doesn't hold.
In some games, equilibria in pure strategies do not exist, players must randomize their actions. It might be possible to use unlearnable automata in order to create pseudo-random strategies.
In this work we have con ned ourselves to a scenario in which one player remains static and the other is adaptive. A more general model will need to account for mutual learning. In such a model, players have to learn non-xed strategies. Furthermore, players may attempt to manipulate each other's learning process.
We have shown the existence of a learning algorithm for the class of simple automata, but have not constructed an algorithm. The automata learning literature Rivest and Schapire, 1993; Kearns and ???, 1994] shows how to construct such algorithms, when \homing sequences" are available -input sequences that guarantee a certain state is reached. A side-e ect of Lemma 3.2 is to identify such a sequence: Once the learning player is thrown out of the consensus cycle, she can return to its rst state by playing C for a known number of rounds.
